Buffalo Law Review
Volume 7

Number 1

Article 6

10-1-1957

Testamentary Freedom and Social Control—After-Born Children:
Part II: Some Basic Problems and Some New Approaches
Saul Touster
University at Buffalo School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons

Recommended Citation
Saul Touster, Testamentary Freedom and Social Control—After-Born Children: Part II: Some Basic
Problems and Some New Approaches, 7 Buff. L. Rev. 47 (1957).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol7/iss1/6

This Leading Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @
University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized
editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM AND SOCIAL CONTROLAFTER-BORN CHILDREN
By SAUL TOUSTER*
PART II:

SOME BASIC PROBLEMS AND SOME NEW APPROACHES

In the first part of this article,97 the author reviewed the background of
after-born children statutes which provide that a child born to a testator after he
makes his will, and who is left unprovided for in the will or by settlement outside the will, can recover its intestate share from testator's estate. It was indicated
that, although the significant and articulated reason behind these statutes was
to carry out and sustain testamentary intent by curing a mistake upon which the
intent was based, the courts have in some measure been moved by the social
purpose of protecting children against disinheritance. In a close examination of
the judicial experience under the New York statute, the view was expressed that
no realistic inferences could be drawn concerning the testator's intent without an
inquiry-which most of these statutes prevent-into the family situation at the
time the will was made, the dispositive scheme expressed in the will, and the
family situation at the time of the testator's death. In determining whether an
after-born child has been mentioned or provided for in a testator's will, the New
York courts have avoided looking to any such relevant material, deciding the
issue only by reference to the language of the will: if the after-born child comes
within a class "mentioned" in the will, it is under all circumstances barred from
the remedy provided by the statute. Although the Court of Appeals in the
Faber98 case broadened the inquiry to include certain family factors, when determining whether a particular transaction constituted a "settlement" that would
bar the after-born child under the statute, the statutory remedy, it was pointed
our, made it impossible to achieve results consistent with what might be inferred
to be testator's intent or with what might be considered the social or moral claims
of the family unit. The after-born child, under these statutes, takes either his
intestate share or nothing, depending on whether he is barred by mention or provision in the will or settlement outside the will. It is this either-or operation of
the statute which creates some of the basic problems requiring solution.
SOME BASIC PROBLEMS

Two of the anomalies of the statute, in terms of ascertaining testamentary in*Associate Professor of Law, University of Buffalo, School of Law. The
author was a consultant to the New York Law Revision Commission on a topic
embracing material dealt with in this article and as such wrote a study for the
Commission which will be published in New York Legislative Document (1957)
No. 65 (D) and in the 1957 Report, Recommendations and Studies of the Law
Revision Commission. This article is written independently of that study and
should not be taken to reflect or represent in any way the views of the Law
Revision Commission.
97. 6 BUFFALO L. REV. 251-282 (1957).
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tent, have already been discussed in Part I. For present purposes, they can be
illustrated by the following case:
A testator with two living children leaves his entire estate to his
wife, but if she does not survive him then to these two children by
name.9 9 In addition to the two named children, an after-born child
survives testator.
The results in this case will be consistent with or defeat probable testamentary
intent depending upon the fortuitous fact of whether or not the wife survives the
testator. If she survives the testator, the after-born child will take an intestate
share under the statute against its mother, to the exclusion of the other two named
children, and contrary to any inference that may be drawn concerning testator's
probable intent. If, on the other hand, the wife fails to survive the testator, the
after-born child will take a statutory share which, under the facts, would result in
equal provision for the children-this being in line with what the testator probably
intended. If, in this example, the testator by some means outside his will, say by
insurance, conferred equal benefits on each of his three children, the issue would
turn on whether this bounty provided for and thus barred the after-born child: if
the child were barred, the two living children named in the will would secure a
preference over the after-born child, if the wife did not survive the testator. For
then they would receive not only their extra-testamentary benefits but the entire
estate under the will, and the after-born child would be excluded, although the
testator by making equal non-testamentary gifts to all three children may be said
to have intended a similar equal distribution of his estate.
The technical operation of the statute causes the most inequitable and
unnecessarily harmful results by (1) the contrasting treatment of after-born
children and children living at the time of the will, and (2) its disruptive impact
upon testamentary plans, especially those involving trusts or other limited interests.
With respect to the former, consider the following example:
The testator with a living child, A, leaves one-half his estate to his
wife, a $9,000 bequest to a charity, and the remainder to child A. He
dies survived by his wife, child A and child X, an after-born child. The
net estate is $90,000.
Under this example, child X, taking his intestate share of the estate as an
after-born child under the statute, would receive one-third, or $30,000. The shares
of the wife, the charity and child A would accordingly be reduced to contribute
to X's statutory share, so that the wife would receive $30,000 ($45,000 reduced
98. 305 N.Y. 200, 111 N.E.2d 883 (1953). See Part I, supra, at note 82 et seq.
99. Throughout the examples used, the qualification "by name" Is added
to dispel the notion of a class gift which might be construed as "mentioning"
and thereby barring the after-born child under the statute.
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by $15,000), the charity would receive $6,000 ($9,000 reduced by $3,000), and
child A would receive $24,000 ($36,000 reduced by $12,000). Without
considering the comparative claims of a spouse or strangers, it is clear that the
after-born child X by taking an unreduced intestate share is preferred over the
living child A whose share under the will must be proportionately reduced by its
contribution to X's share.
This example may be generalized into the following startling rules: As a
dass, after-born children will always be preferred over living children as a dass,
whenever the testator has made any testamentary provision for persons other than
distributees. 100 Living children (child A in our example), will never be on a par
with an after-born child, unless the testator leaves his entire estate to those who
would take by intestacy-that is, children and spouse. We may state these harsh
rules in different terms: Whenever the testator, in his will, leaves his living
children as a class less than what would be their intestate shares, or while leaving
them the equivalent of their intestate shares makes a testamentary gift to strangers,
in either event-probably the vast majority of cases-the after-born children are
preferred over those living at the time of the wilL
Let us now turn to another contingency which demonstrates the interplay
of our statute with the statutory share of the spouse: Suppose a testator provides
a statutory minimum for his spouse to prevent her electing against the will, and
an after-born child, taking its statutory share, thereby reduces the testamentary
provision for the spouse to less than the minimum. It is hardly surprising that the
New York courts have held that the spouse may, in these circumstances, elect
against the will, to assure herself of her statutory minimum. 10 1 This would not
offend the testator's scheme if he had provided for an outright gift since the
spouse would be taking the same amount either under the will or by election.
Where, however, in the more common case, the testator establishes a marital
100. For more detailed description of this result of the statutes in operation, see Mathews, PretermittedHeirs: An Analysis of Statutes, 29 COLUM. L. REv.
748, 757-760 (1929). The qualification is made here that the after-born children
are preferred as a class only; for there may be cases where a living child is preferred although living children as a class are not. For example: A testator with

three living children leaves all his estate to one child and dies survived by these
three children and an after-born child. The after-born child's intestate share

will be one-quarter of the estate, the child named in the will receiving threequarters of the estate.

101. Matter of Wurmbrand, 194 Misc. 203, 86 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Surr. Ct. 1949)

aff'd, 275 App. Div. 915, 90 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1st Dep't 1949); and Matter of Vicedomini, 285 App. Div. 62, 136 N.Y.S.2d 259 (2d Dep't 1954), modifying 195 Misc.

1057, 91 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Surr. Ct. 1949). In both cases a childless testator left half
of his estate to his spouse and half to collaterals; an after-born child took his
intestate share under the statute, or two-thirds of the estate; this reduced the
spouse's interest under the will to below one-fhird and therefore she was held
entitled to elect a one-third share against the will. Thus nothing was left to
the collaterals who were beneficiaries under the will.
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trust, it can be seen how the statute's operation violates the testator's intent as
expressed in his will. The following examples 0 2 will illustrate this:
A testator with living children wants to give his wife the minimum
required by law. He therefore leaves by will one-third of his estate in
trust for her for life, the remainder of the trust and the balance of the
estate to named children and collaterals. He is survived by his wife and
children, including an after-born child taking under the statute.
In this case, the after-born child by taking his intestate share, whatever its
amount, will reduce the trust for the wife to less than the statutory minimum
and thus allow her to take by election one-third the estate absolutely. This will be
true, as can be seen, whether or not there are living children. For, so long as
the wife's trust must contribute anything to the statutory share of an after-born
child, it will fall below the minimum required to prevent an election. In the
following example, the disruptive impact of the statute will be even more drastic:
Testator with one living child, to secure the maximum advantages under the Federal estate tax laws, provides in his will for a marital trust
for his wife of one-half his estate, leaving the other half in trust for
the named living child. He is survived by his wife, the named living
child and an after-born child taking under the statute.
Here, by the invasion of the after-born child, the marital trust will be reduced to
one-third the estate limiting thereby its tax advantage. And if the marital trust
were less than one-half, the resulting invasion would leave the wife with less than
one-third, and thus give her a right to elect. When we consider how many
testamentary plans are dependent upon trust provisions to fulfill various of the
testator's objectives, we can readily visualize how destructively the statute may
operate in a particular case.
As has been pointed out previously, the main reason for the statute's failure
is that it is only partially sound in terms of presumed intention-although we may
presume that a testator would have intended to provide for a pretermitted child,
there is no basis to presume he would have given the child its intestate share.103
Moreover, it should be apparent that in allowing an after-born child to take
against its own parent, i.e., the testator's spouse, the statute runs counter to what
is a common practice of testators to leave all or most of their estate to a spouse
in the expectation that under this arrangement the children, whether living at
the time or after-born, will be cared for. In large measure the basic problems of
the statute stem from the "either-or" remedy; but this, in turn, stems from the
102. In the discussion following these examples (as in the previous material),
the New York law with respect to a spouse's right of election Isassumed. See
N.Y. DEC. EsT. LAw § §18, 83.

103. See Part I, supra, at note 92.
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failure of the statute to take into consideration (1) the testator's dispositive
scheme as a guide to his intention; or (2) the justifiable confidence reposed in a
spouse to care for and provide for their children. How solve these problems
of the statute within a system of testamentary freedom? A number of new
statutory approaches have been taken which attempt solutions.
THE TEXAS STATUTE

One of the first and most promising approaches was made in Texas by a
proviso added in 1931 to its statute. The original Texas statute had two separate
provisions, one applicable where the testator at the time he made his will had
children living, and the other where no child was living when the will was
made.' 0 4 In the former case, the after-born child was entitled to his intestate
share; in the latter, where all the children were after-born, the will was deemed
revoked unless the after-born child or children died before reaching the age of
twenty-one without having married. This conditional limitation was apparently
inserted to cover the case of the sole after-born child dying in infancy, a contingency which plainly does not require the complete voiding of the testator's
dispositive plan. In general, both statutes operated pretty much the way other
statutes did which do not distinguish between a testator who at the time of
making his will has living children and one who does not.1°0 Recent amendments, however, have added to both statutes the following proviso:
"provided, however, that where a surviving husband or wife is the father
or mother of all of testator's children, exclusive of adopted children, and
said surviving husband or wife is the principal beneficiary in said
testator's last will and testament, to the entire exclusion by silence or
otherwise, of all of said testator's children, then and in that event the
foregoing provision of this Section shall- not apply nor be considered
in the construction of said last will and testament."'1 6
What this proviso does is to acknowledge the social basis of the statute by
making a certain kind of inference as to the testator's intent. By denying the
statute's remedy where a testator leaves the principal part of his estate to his
spouse, the legislature is concluding that this would have been testator's disposition
had he considered the possibility of future children; and to the extent that this
104. TEXAS CODE, Arts. 8291, 8292, 8293.
105. For a detailed review of the operation of the statutes in states distinguishing these two family situations, see Mathews, op. cit. supra, note 100, pp.
753 et seq. Although the statutes distinguish these two situations, no significant
difference flows from the fact the testator had, or had not, living children when
he made his will. In general, the same types of facts regarding provision for the
after-born child can bar the operation of the statute in either event.
106. Added in 1931 to statute covering situation where child living at time
of will (TEXAs CODE, Arts. 8291, 8292); added in 1949 where no child living at
time of will (Ibid., Art. 8293). Since reenacted, and amended in minor details,
in Tsxms PI0BATE CODE, §66 and 67 (1955).
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legislative "finding" of the testator's intent may be wrong, the legislature can
still rely on the fact that the surviving spouse, being the parent of the after-born
children, will care for them appropriately. Of course this inference regarding the
testator's intent is a sound one only where he has left the principal part of his
estate to a spouse at a time when he had other children; it is less convincing
where he had no children. In the latter case, we do not know how he would have
treated his children; even so, it must be conceded that the policy of relying upon
the usual motivations of a spouse provides an adequate basis for barring the
operation of a statute which would seriously upset a testamentary plan. To this
extent, the proviso appears to accept somewhat more openly the social objectives
of these statutes which, up to now, the legislatures and courts have left unstated.
Although the approach of the Texas proviso is sound, looking as it does to
the testator's dispositive scheme as a guide for its application, its operation leaves
much to be desired. Where there are both after-born children and children who
were living at the time of the will, there seems to be no reason to require that the
surviving spouse be the parent of "all of testator's children." It would seem
sufficient protection for the after-born child if the surviving spouse receiving the
principal part of the estate is the parent merely of such after-born child. But
there are more serious objections. Why require for the operation of the proviso,
the "entire exclusion . . . of all of said testator's children?" Does a nominal
bequest or a keepsake left to a living child make the proviso inoperative?IOT
Apparently. But assuming this problem were corrected, there remains an objection
to the very core of this approach.
The proviso will operate or not depending upon whether the surviving
spouse is found to be "the principal beneficiary" of the testator's estate. If, in a
doubtful case, a court holds the spouse to be the principal beneficiary, the afterborn child takes nothing; if it holds to the contrary, the statute operates and the
child takes its intestate share (or the will is conditionally revoked). And yet, to
the extent that the testator has left property to a spouse at all, it should normally
be considered partly out of consideration for the children of the marriage. Thus,
in the usual situation, the "either-or" result, under the proviso, does not conform
to testator's intent. There is a second consideration: in view of the grave
consequences of its application, the statute puts a high premium on litigating the
question of whether the spouse was "the principal beneficiary." The Model
Probate Code, which is modelled on the Texas statute, does little to cure this since
its proviso depends on whether a testator who had living children left "substan107. See Miller, Changes in the Law of Wills, in Proceedings, Texas Probate Code Institute, Texas Law School, pp. 24-29 (1955) for a description of the

development of the proviso and some critical comments.

TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM AND SOCIAL CONTROL: PART 1tially all his estate to his surviving spouse."'0° The same fateful "either-or"
result will follow the eventual judicial determination of whether a spouse was
left "substantially all" of testator's estate.
THE PENNSYLVANIA STATUTE

Instead of using the provision for the spouse to qualify the right itself, it
would be more in keeping with our inferences as to testamentary intent to use
the spouse's provision to qualify the quantum of the right. If we assume that the
testator intended the spouse's share to be for general family protection, then it
would be reasonable to keep that share completely immune from any claim by
an after-born child; accordingly if, under certain circumstances, the statute gives
the child a right to some of the estate, let him recover this part from legatees
other than the surviving spouse who is his parent. Under the Texas and Model
statutes, if the surviving spouse takes a large share under the will, but it is
something less than the "principal" share, or "substantially all," the after-born
child takes under the statute, usually to the real disadvantage of the spouse and
in violation of the testamentary scheme. The Pennsylvania Wills Act of 1947
has, to a rather limited extent, recognized this. To protect the surviving spouse's
share, it provides that an after-born child taking under its statute
"shall receive out of the testator's property not passing to a surviving
spouse, such share as he would have received if the testator had died
unmarried and intestate owning
only that portion of his estate not
01
passing to a surviving spouse."'
Under this statute any part of the estate going to the surviving spouse-which,
of course, may be less than "substantially all"-will be saved to the spouse. In
addition, the provision for the spouse, by not qualifying the right of the after-born
child, still leaves him free to recover his statutory share proportionately from
legatees other than the spouse. We may note, however, the failure of the statute
to require that the surviving spouse be the parent of the after-born child; only
in such event, is it safe to assume that the testator is providing indirectly for the
child. Subject to this reservation, the Pennsylvania statute seems preferable to
108. Section 41 (a) of the MODEL PROBATE CODE reads as follows:

"When a testator fails to provide in his will for any

of his children born or adopted after the making of his last
will, such child, whether born before or after the testator's

death, shall receive a share in the estate of the testator equal
in value to that which he would have received if the testator
had died intestate, unless it appears from the will that such
omission was Intentional, or unless when the will was executed the testator had one or more children known to him
to be living and devised substantially all his estate to his

surviving spouse."
Printed in Simes and Basye, Problems in Probate Law, Michigan Legal Studies,
(1946).
109.

PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon) tit. 20, §180.7 (4) (1950).
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the Texas or Model statutes, being as it is more consistent with probable
testamentary intent.
None of these statutes, however, attempts to cure the inequitable treatment
of children living when the will was made-their interests under the will must
always contribute to make up the after-born child's intestate share. We may
illustrate the resulting inequities by an example arising under the Pennsylvania
statute. Suppose a testator left one-half of his estate to his wife, and divided the
remaining one-half between an only child and a charity. An after-born child
would, under the statute, be entitled to his intestate share (one-half) of the part
not passing to the surviving spouse; and this share would be made up from the
shares going to the living child and the charity. Again, to the extent that a nondistributee has an interest under the will, the statute discriminates against the
living child in favor of the after-born child.
THE SOUTH CAROLINA STATUTE

The statute of South Carolina not only attempts to assure equality in the

treatment of living and after-born children, it also uses the testamentary provisions
for living children as a guide to determine how the testator would have treated
after-born children. Under the provisions of the South Carolina statute the
unprovided-for after-born child
"shall be entitled to an equal share of all real and personal estates given
to any other child or children, who shall contribute to make up such
share or shares according to their respective interests passing to them
under such will."110
To a limited degree, this statute represents a step forward in its use of a realistic
guide to the testator's probable treatment of his after-born child. However, by
making the statute operative only where there are living children who receive
gifts, it refuses intervention in the situation which presents the most urgent
demand for social protection, i.e., where all the children are after-born, the
testator having made his will when no children were living. But if we put this
objection aside and observe only how the statute works when there are living
children, we must conclude that the statute operates equitably depending upon
rather arbitrary features of the will. If the living children are left interests
determined by percentages of the estate, then the after-born child's equal sharing
in these benefits will probably be consonant with the testator's intent. Thus,
where a testator leaves half of his estate to two named children, it may be thought
that he assigned this half of his estate to his children's collective interest and
that, had he contemplated the future child, he would have included that child
110. S. C.

CODE

§§19-235,-236 (1952).
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within such a gift. Where, however, the provisions made for the living children
are stated in monetary amounts, the spreading of these gifts among the legateechildren and the after-born child are likely to violate the te--tator's probable
intent. For example: a testator leaves $15,000 to an only living child and there
are two after-born children; under the statute each child will receive $5,000,
which is not very close to testator's intention. Moreover, whenever strangers take
as legatees, there is no reason to allow their shares under the will to remain
immune while the living children alone bear the burden of contributing to the
after-born child's share. To this extent, the South Carolina statute seems to deal
less equitably with the family unit than the conventional statute.
THE PROBLEM OF COMPLEX WILLS
One of the problems implicit in the South Carolina statute is that the afterborn child's "equal share" in gifts left to the living children becomes surprisingly
unequal under the normal complexities of will dispositions. How, under this
statute, do we deal with a testator, with three living children, who disinherits
child A, leaves a small bequest to child B, and a large bequest to child C? The
after-born child X will come in to share the bequests-but in what proportions?
Since there are four children, he probably will take one-quarter from the bequests
to B and C. It is not likely that he would be permitted to take half of each-for
then he would not be sharing equally, but would in fact be preferred. And yet,
how close can this result be said to be to testator's probable intent? Suppose
further that the gift to child B was a life estate defeasible upon marriage, or a
trust in which the principal vests upon reaching certain ages or upon marriage.
How does child X share in this gift? Under what conditions? It would probably
be said that the testator would have intended a similarly conditioned gift for the
after-born child. But can this be a reasonable inference when testator has disinherited child A and given a large outright gift to child C? We are obviously
faced with problems of motivation which, under our system of inheritance,
cannot be explored. And under the South Carolina type of statute, further
questions remain unanswered: Does the after-born child share in a gift left to a
child for a specific purpose peculiar to that child, e.g., a gift for the child's
college education? Can special conditions in a gift carry over from the child
named in the will to the after-born child who has come in to share the gift, e.g.,
a gift made defeasible upon marriage outside a specified church? Does the afterborn child share in a gift made to a child in appreciation of special qualities or
exertions, e.g., for A's kindness or services in the family household?
The problems of the complex will not only affect the relative treatment of
children under the South Carolina statute, but even the testamentary scheme
under the Pennsylvania statute whose very object was both to give "ample
protection to the child and [to] avoid frequent occasions for disruption of well
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laid plans."'1 1 As already noted, under the latter statute the interests "passing to
a surviving spouse" are immune from any claim by an after-born child. Consider
the application of this clause to a complex will which creates a trust for a spouse,
trusts for living children, with cross-remainders to the children or the spouse.
What interest is deemed "passing" to the spouse? Where she has a life interest
terminable upon re-marriage, how does the child share in the corpus of the fund?
Does the child take a presently valued interest in the remainder, computed on the
basis of life expectancy and re-marriage tables? If so, will this not reduce the
spouse's life interest by reducing corpus? The alternative would be for the child
to wait out the happening of the event, the spouse's death or re-marriage, and
then take a proportionate share of the remainder as it vests in enjoyment. This
apparently has been the approach in Pennsylvania. 112 But does not this suspension
of the statutory interest run counter to one of the underlying policies in the
statute, namely, to provide care or support for children who, being after-born,
are likely to be the youngest in the family? A more difficult problem is presented
where the spouse is a remainderman after a life interest in a stranger. How
does the after-born child recover from this interest? Does he take from corpus
a presently valued equivalent of the stranger's life interest, or does he merely
share in income during the existence of the life estate? The latter is probably
the better solution since many interests terminable on various contingencies are
incapable of actuarial conversion into present values. Even more difficult
problems are presented where the spouse is given (a) a power to consume;
or (b) a power to appoint; or (c) an interest which will vest only in the spouse's
estate and not be itself enjoyed by the spouse. In these cases, how are we to
treat the property involved? Shall it be deemed "passing to" the spouse or not,
for the purposes of the statute? As soon as we attempt to answer these questions,
we realize how far we have gone in doing something which, under our present
system, courts are so aghast at doing-that is, what they describe when they say:
"We are not here to make a new will for the testator." There is no doubt that a
statute such as Pennsylvania's does just that, and it does so in order to approximate
equitably what testator would have intended had he forseen the possibility of
future children. And yet, if we are to go so far in remaking the testator's will, in
the light of inferences drawn from the limited information available within the
four corners of the will, should we not more properly ask what the testator
would have intended; not if he had forseen future children, but if he had been
aware of the very nature of his misapprehension, if he had known what the court
111. Advisory Commission's comment, Anno., supra, note 109. The Commision considered the new statute "a distinct improvement" over the previous
statute, which resembled New York's.

112. See In re Fownes Estate, 82 Pa. D. & C. 518 (1953).

One hopes that

the Pennsylvania courts will not be faced with the multiplicity and complexity
of dispositions which the Internal Revenue Code and Regulations has had to
deal under the estate tax marital deduction, which is expressed In terms of
"any interest in property which passes" to a surviving spouse. INT. REV.CODE OF
1954, §2056.
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now knows with his family situation before it?"'3 As has been pointed out before,
under most circumstances no realistic inference as to how a testator would have
treated an after-born child can be drawn from the facts existing at the time the
will is made--certainly not as to the amount of the provision he would have
made. 1 4 And yet this is what is attempted by the legislative presumption
implicit in the statute, that testator (under the usual statute) would provide an
intestate share, or (under the Pennsylvania statute) an intestate share of the
estate not passing to the spouse. 15
The problems cannot be minimized in the belief that the more complex a
will the more likely the drafting attorney will remind the testator to mention or
make provision for future children and thus avoid the statute. Unfortunately,
this has not been the case; and the already large volume of litigation under these
statutes will likely increase with the modern tendency toward multiple marriages
and their consequence-new sets of children born to testators, often late in life.
In the circumstances, new solutions, more flexible than those in the foregoing
statutes, will have to be sought.
113. To some extent the testator who is not aware of the possibility of
future children when he makes his will resembles the testator who destroys his
will upon a mistaken assumption. In the latter case we have what is called dependent relative revocation, and we often save the testator from his mistaken
act. As Professor Warren stated the standard: "The inquiry should always be:
What would the testator have desired had he been informed of the true situation? And there is no objection to going fully into parol evidence to ascertain
his attitude, for one is not varying a writing but an act." Warren, Dependent
Relative Revocation, 33 HARV. L. REV. 337, 345 (1920). Putting aside the latter
point about varying a writing, might we not call the situation of the unforeseen
after-born child a case of "dependent relative execution" and inquire into what
testator would have desired had he been informed of the true situation-which
must be the situation at his death? The question, it would seem, must remain

rhetorical.

114. Consider the case of a posthumous child for whom testator had no
chance to provide. If such child were born blind, can we say the testator would
have provided for it in the same manner as for a healthy child?
115. Another way in which the after-born child statutes generally disrupt
testamentary dispositions is in their effect upon the administration of the estate.
Since each of the legatees and devisees must contribute proportionately to make
up the share of the after-born child, each gift must abate, and nominal or
memento gifts must bear a burden which testator could not reasonably have in-

tended. In some states, an even more destructive form of abatement obtains;
contribution to the after-born child's share being required first from residuary

gifts which are most likely for the benefit of those closest to the testator. For
a complete breakdown of the types of provisions applicable to both abatement
and contribution to the after-born child, see notes to section 184, MODEL PROBATE
CODE, op. cit. supra, note 108, pp. 360-365. The Alabama statute tries to do what
the basic Pennsylvania statute does by requiring all legacies to be used up in
contributing to the pretermitted child before he can reach residuary legacies
to either the spouse or other children. ALA. CODE tit. 61 §11 (1940). The effectiveness of this scheme is limited in the important instances that the spouse and
other children are the principal beneficiaries under the will. Nor is it reasonable to think that the spouse's share should be protected only when it is a residuary gift.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
THE FAMILY MAINTENANCE APPROACH

The foregoing discussion has shown that whenever we are called on to draw
realistic inferences concerning the testator's intent in a particular situation, we are
inclined to consider many facts which, under these statutes, must be classified
as extra-legal: the testator's motivations in his treatment of his then living
children; the moral claim that an after-born child presents, especially in relation
to those who would otherwise receive the estate; the family's situation
at the time of testator's death. Considering the difficulties arising even under the
more modern approaches of the Texas or Pennsylvania or South Carolina statutes
-or under a statute combining their best features-we are led to the conclusion
that there is no solution sufficiently flexible to cover all types of family situations
under our present system of inheritance, a system which basically provides for
only two alternatives: dispositions by will, or fixed shares by intestacy or election.
The system of flexible restraints on testation, which goes under the name of
dependent relatives' relief legislation or decedent's family maintenance legislation,
may provide a real alternative to the approach now taken in the United States.
Under a system of family maintenance, a court is given the power to order
payment out of an estate for the purpose of providing for and maintaining
surviving members of the decedents family who have not been adequately
provided for by will.1" 6 Such a system of discretionary maintenance has been
functioning in Maine since 1821 with respect to intestate or insolvent estates,
and since 1835 with respect to testate estates." 7 The operation of the statute is
confined to widows. A more recent and independent scheme, utilizing this
approach, originated in New Zealand whose 1900 basic statute has been gradually
116. For an excellent review of this system see Laufer, Flexible Restraints
on Testamentary Freedom-A Report on Decedents' Family Maintenance Legis-

lation, 69 HARV. L. REv. 277 (1955). Most of the factual material hereinafter presented comes from this article.
117. For a history of the Maine statute, see Brown v. Hodgdon, 31 Me. 65
(1849). The present statute, in substantially the same form, reads as follows:
Allowance to widows from personal estate. In the settlement of any intestate estate, or of any testate estate which
is insolvent or in which no provision is made for the widow
in the will of her husband, or when she duly waives the
provision made, the judge may allow the widow so much
of the personal estate, besides her ornaments and wearing
apparel, as he deems necessary, according to the degree and
estate of her husband and the state of the family under
her care; he may also allow her any 1 pew in a meeting
house, of which the deceased died seized; and such allowance, when recorded, vests title in her; and when an estate
which, at the time of said allowance, was considered Insolvent, ultimately appears to be solvent, the judge by a subsequent decree may make the widow a further reasonable
allowance. When, after an allowance has been made from
any estate, additional personal property belonging to said
estate comes to the knowledge of the judge, he may make
a further allowance to her therefrom. ME. REV. STAT. C.
156, §156.
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extended to apply to all dependent members of the decedent's immediate family,
whether he died testate or intestate. New Zealand's lead has since been followed
in varying degrees by all Australian states, by England, and by a number of the
Canadian provinces. In some instances, a ceiling on the maintenance award is
determined by what would be the applicant's intestate share. Professor Laufer
summarizes the provisions of the typical statute, insofar as it affects a testate
estate, in the following terms:
"In substance, it assures to a decedent's surviving family, above all
his spouse and children, adequate maintenance whenever his will does
not provide it. Maintenance may only be granted out of the net estate,
i.e., after all claims have been discharged. A dependent who claims that
the will failed to make proper provision for him may apply to the court
within twelve months of probate. Eligible dependents are not only the
testator's spouse, child, or grandchild, but also his parents and his
adopted and illegitimate children. Upon application the court will
determine whether the testator has adequately provided for the
dependent. If it finds that he has not, it may in its discretion order
that suitable provisions be made out of the estate, or it may refuse an
order if it finds that the dependent's character or conduct "disentitled"
him. It may order that provision shall be made in the form of periodic
payments or in a lump sum. It may attach any conditions it deems fit to
its order. It may provide that the incidence of the order shall fall
ratably on the entire estate or it may exonerate certain portions, either
completely or partially. Save where the dependent has been granted a
lump sum, the court may later set aside, vary, or susl~end its order where
it finds that the dependent's situation has improved. The court's power
extends over the entire estate even if the will disposes of only a part of
the estate." 18
Two major objections which have been made to these statutes appear
unjustified in the light of over fifty years' experience in applying them. With
respect to the objection that this type of statute will breed litigation, Professor
Laufer points out that this fear has proved unfounded. The volume of litigation
under the Maine or Commonwealth type statute seems appreciably smaller than
under conventional statutes of American jurisdictions. 110 One has only to look
to the heavy case-load in New York involving the spouse's right to election,
or the rights of after-born children, to realize that litigation is more likely
the result of statutes which fail to meet the current needs of the family
unit, than those which allow the exercise of judicial discretion.12 0 The other
objection, that the wide area for the play of judicial discretion would result in an
undisciplined exercise of judicial power, has likewise proved unfounded. The
cases, in these jurisdictions, have in fact developed along characteristic common
law lines, establishing criteria and principles, "a climate of decision," which
118. Op. cit. supra, note 116, at 282-283.
119. Ibid., 314.
120. See Part I, supra, 6 BUFFALO L. REv. 251-255.
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"enables a practitioner to predict, within reasonable limits, the likely reaction of a
court to a particular set of circumstances. He is thus enabled on the one hand to
restrain testators from making unreasonable provisions and on the other to
advise dependents and beneficiaries against engaging in fruitless litigation."' 2'
It may be argued that adoption of this approach-requiring as it does a
complete re-orientation to problems of inheritance and family responsibilityinvolves an extensive commitment when all we seek is a solution for what is after
all a narrow problem: the ills afflicting after-born child statutes. The disproportion
may be admitted, especially when we see how small and interstitial is the after-born
child problem in the total fabric of family rights. And further, it can be argued,
such an approach is equally valid for children left unprovided for who are not
pretermitted within the meaning of a statute, and for surviving spouses, or other
dependents, as well This is true, but until such time as we are ready to essay
this approach in the whole area of family rights, could it not be applied to the
problem of the pretermitted child statutes, especially in view of their fundamental
and far-reaching defects?
At the outset, however, a distinction in objectives should be noted: The
main objective of an after-born child statute is to provide for distribution to a
child omitted through oversight; the main objective of the family maintenance
system is to provide for support of a dependent in need. One looks to presumed
testamentary intent, the other social duties. But despite this difference in point
of view, the system of family maintenance has not been carried out by the courts
in disregard of testamentary intent; it has rather replaced an artificial and often
invalid presumption with an intelligent inquiry into the real intention of a
decedent. The cases involving after-born children arising in these jurisdictions
illustrate this, for they not only concern themselves with the income needs of the
petitioning child but also with his right to share in the corpus of the estate in the
light of the dispositions made and the family situation.12 2 In fact, Professor Laufer
reports that the courts often "protect rather than limit the testator's freedom,"
by seeking to correct dispositions based upon mistakes or made inequitable by
changed circumstances.' 2 ' As has been pointed out, the after-born child statute,
although rationalized in terms of testamentary intent, has served to carry out the
social policy of protecting children whose needs are most urgent. 12 4 In similar
fashion, the family maintenance statutes, although originally intended to serve
the social needs of support and maintenance, have in fact tended to carry out
testamentary intent. For they not only assume that satisfying the needs of
121. Laufer, op. cit., supra, note 116, at 313-314.
122. See e.g., Will of Spense, 1929 St. R. Queensland, W. N. 15.
123. Op. cit. supra, note 116, at 295. For example, a testator was protected
from the results of his own misunderstanding of what was in his will and from
the error of a draftsman. Ibid.
124. See Part I, supra, 6 BuFFALo L. REV. 251 et seq.
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decedent's family is consistent with the decedent's probable intent, but by making
a broad inquiry into decedent's family situation and dispositive plans, they go far
toward realizing the "true" intention.
The dilemma of the "true" intention probably derives from the nature of
the legal institution 6f the will itself. A will is made on the basis of known
facts and a more or less rough estimate of probable future events which might
change these facts. Although the will is ambulatory we know it too often never
catches up with the changes. This implicit limitation on the institution of the
will and its consequences should, it is submitted, be mitigated in the special case
of pretermitted children-by allowing them some claim on the testator's estate
which does not violate either testator's intention or the social demands of the
family. Despite the excellent experience in the Commonwealth jurisdictions,
there may remain doubts-perhaps raised by significant differences in the make-up
and traditions of the respective bars-that a system of discretionary awards could
not work in the United States where distribution rather than support is the
critical element. But by limiting this discretionary approach to the area of pretermitted children, where admittedly there is no sound solution, could we not work
out principles and standards which would not only solve this problem, but would
serve as guides in dealing with the more complex problems of the rights of surviv2
ing spouses and other dependent relatives?1 7,
125. Under such a proposal, an application could be made for an unprovided-for after-born child, for the court to make a provision for him out of the
testator's estate in the light of the then family situation, with the child's intestate share setting a ceiling upon the award. In exercising its discretion, the
court would consider not only the relative need of the child but also the intention of the testator, using as "signposts"--in the language of the Court of Appeals
in Matter of Faber-not only the terms of the will, but the family circumstances at the time it was made, the provisions made for his family outside the
will, and the family circumstances at his death.

